Risk dominance

Results: 136



#Item
51Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games on Networks* Gary Charness†, Francesco Feri‡, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez§, and Matthias Sutter# Abstract. We study behavior and equilibrium selection in experimental net

Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games on Networks* Gary Charness†, Francesco Feri‡, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez§, and Matthias Sutter# Abstract. We study behavior and equilibrium selection in experimental net

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Source URL: www.econ.ucsb.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-09-17 17:39:44
52American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2013, 5(4): 31–54 http://dx.doi.orgmicStrategic Tournaments† By Ayala Arad and Ariel Rubinstein* A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-pla

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2013, 5(4): 31–54 http://dx.doi.orgmicStrategic Tournaments† By Ayala Arad and Ariel Rubinstein* A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-pla

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Source URL: arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-30 11:00:16
53Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks  Nobuyuki Hanaki1, Alexander Peterhansl2,3, Peter S. Dodds3, Duncan J. Watts3,4,5  1

Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks Nobuyuki Hanaki1, Alexander Peterhansl2,3, Peter S. Dodds3, Duncan J. Watts3,4,5 1

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Source URL: www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr

Language: English - Date: 2009-09-14 05:12:51
54Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population1 David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer2 First version: September 29, 1999 This version: May 10, 2000

Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population1 David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer2 First version: September 29, 1999 This version: May 10, 2000

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2000-05-10 11:49:25
55I  Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups 1

I Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups 1

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2015-01-25 05:06:13
56When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
57Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41
58The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12
59Applying Portfolio Theory to EU Electricity Planning and Policy-Making, IEA/EET Working Paper

Applying Portfolio Theory to EU Electricity Planning and Policy-Making, IEA/EET Working Paper

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Source URL: www.awerbuch.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-11 07:33:43
60© 1999, Gregory Carey[removed]Chapter 11: Association Study - 1 Chapter 11: The Association Study Introduction

© 1999, Gregory Carey[removed]Chapter 11: Association Study - 1 Chapter 11: The Association Study Introduction

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Source URL: psych.colorado.edu

Language: English - Date: 2006-06-13 15:16:24